The effects of oil shocks on government expenditures and government revenues nexus in Iran (as a developing oil-export based economy) by Dizaji, S.F. (Sajjad Faraji)
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
No. 540 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sajjad Faraji Dizaji  
 
 
 
 
May 2012 
 
 
The effects of oil shocks on government expenditures 
and government revenues nexus in Iran 
(as a developing oil-export based economy) 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 0921-0210 
 
The Institute of Social Studies is Europe’s longest-established centre of higher education and 
research in development studies. On 1 July 2009, it became a University Institute of the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam (EUR). Post-graduate teaching programmes range from six-week diploma 
courses to the PhD programme. Research at ISS is fundamental in the sense of laying a scientific 
basis for the formulation of appropriate development policies. The academic work of ISS is 
disseminated in the form of books, journal articles, teaching texts, monographs and working 
papers. The Working Paper series provides a forum for work in progress which seeks to elicit 
comments and generate discussion. The series includes academic research by staff, PhD 
participants and visiting fellows, and award-winning research papers by graduate students. 
Working Papers are available in electronic format at www.iss.nl 
 
Please address comments and/or queries for information to: 
Institute of Social Studies 
P.O. Box 29776 
2502 LT The Hague 
The Netherlands  
or  
E-mail: wpapers@iss.nl 
3 
Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT  4 
1 INTRODUCTION 5 
2   LITERATURE REVIEW 8 
2.1 Literature on the relationship between government revenues and 
government expenditures 8 
2.2 Literature on the effects of oil shocks on the economy 11 
3  METHODOLOGY 14 
4 MODELING AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 16 
4.1 An SVAR model for the first group of the variables 16 
4.1.1 The results of the SVAR model for first group of the 
variables 18 
4.2 A VAR model for the second group of the variables 23 
4.2.1 The results of the VAR model for the second group of the 
variables 24 
4.2.2 The results of the VECM for the second group of the 
variables 33 
5   THE IRANIAN ECONOMY, SANCTIONS AND THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF THIS STUDY 36 
6  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 38 
REFERENCES  40 
4 
ABSTRACT 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the dynamic relationship 
between government revenues and government expenditures in Iran as a 
developing oil export based economy. Moreover, I want to know how 
government expenditures and revenues respond to oil price (revenue) shocks. I 
use two different groups of the variables with two different time periods 
(quarterly and annually) to investigate the robustness and reliability of the 
results and to provide a more comprehensive base for comparison against 
different methodologies. For the first group of the variables (including oil 
price, oil revenues to GDP ratio, government total expenditures to GDP ratio 
and a dummy variable for capturing the effects of war with Iraq) I apply an 
SVAR model using annual data for the period 1970-2008. The results of the 
impulse response functions and variance decomposition analysis indicate that 
the causality is running from oil revenues to GDP ratio to government total 
expenditures to GDP ratio. Moreover the contribution of oil revenue shocks in 
explaining the government expenditures to GDP ratio is stronger than the 
contribution of oil price shocks. For the second group of the variables (oil 
revenues, government total revenues, government current expenditures, 
government capital expenditures, money supply and CPI) unrestricted VAR 
and VEC models have been applied using quarterly data for the period 1990:2-
2009:1. The results of the impulse response functions and variance 
decompositions analysis for both VAR and VEC models indicate that the 
strong causality is running from government revenues to government 
expenditures (both current and capital) in Iranian economy while the evidence 
for the reverse causality is very weak. The results show that in the VEC model 
which the long-run behavior of endogenous variables is restricted to converge 
to their co-integration relationships, oil revenue shocks can affect the other 
macroeconomic variables more directly while in the VAR model this changes 
and works through the total revenues channel. Moreover the findings indicate 
that government revenues, government expenditures and money supply are 
important determinants of domestic price level in Iranian economy.  
Overall my results support the revenue-spending hypothesis for Iran. In 
this context Iran should enhance the effectiveness of fiscal policy by making 
budget expenditure less driven by revenue availability. This policy can help to 
avoid the costs and instability that variations in public spending generate 
mostly due to the fluctuations in oil revenues. 
Keywords 
Iran, government expenditures, government revenues, oil shocks, vector 
autoregression (VAR), sanctions. 
 
JEL Classification: C 32; H 27; H 53; H 61. 
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The effects of oil shocks on government expenditures 
and government revenues nexus in Iran 1 
(as a developing oil-export based economy) 
1 Introduction 
The unique role of oil revenues in the structure of government budgets and 
expenditures is a special characteristic of the developing oil export economies 
like Iran. The Iranian economy largely depends on income from oil. Oil 
revenues are the main source of financing government expenditures and 
imports of products. Since on average 60% of government revenues come 
from oil and gas, the budget is especially affected by sudden negative or 
positive shocks in oil prices. Economic performance has been affected by oil 
revenue volatility and “stop-go” policies, resulting in boom and bust cycles. 
Transitory oil price increases have caused the spending to increase, often 
maintained even after oil revenues had decreased again. Despite higher oil 
prices and revenues in recent years, the Iranian government budget deficits are 
still a challenging issue, in part due to the huge amount of state subsidies on 
energy and comestible goods.  
Table 1 presents the shares of various sources of financing the budget deficits 
in Iran over the past fiscal years. The table shows that a very big portion of 
annual budget deficits in Iran is financed through withdrawals from OSF. This 
is similar to spending the oil revenues directly and has strong inflationary 
effects through increasing money supply in the economy. 
 
                                                  TABLE 1 
                            Financing budget deficit (Iranian fiscal year (FY)) 
 
2005-2006 (FY) 2006-2007(FY) 2007-2008(FY) 2008-2009(FY) 2009-2010(FY)* 
 Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual 
State bond 6.1 8.2 5.1 3.1 3.2 3.8 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Foreign 
borrowing 
2.7 0.8 3 0.4 2.1 0.0 1.6 0.0 1.4 0.1 
Privatization 26 2.1 4.5 0.5 30.9 3.1 20.6 5.0 43.7 15.3 
Oil 
Stabilization 
Fund 
61 83.3 83.6 88.5 57.5 85.6 71.5 83.1 49.8 70.6 
Others 4.3 5.6 3.7 7.5 6.2 7.5 4.5 11.8 5.1 14.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*: Only for the first nine months of the fiscal year. 
Source: Survey of the Iranian Economy, Karafarin Bank, Online E-library, accessed on April 10, 2012. 
                                                
1 This working paper was written as a visiting scholar to ISS (The author is a PhD 
candidate in economics at Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran). I thank ISS and 
in particular staff group 1 for hospitality and support. Special acknowledgment is due 
to Prof. Peter A.G. van Bergeijk (ISS) for detailed comments and helpful suggestions. 
Also I wish to thank Dr. Ebrahim Hosseini Nasab, Dr. Reza Najarzadeh and Dr. 
Abbaas Asari (Tarbiat Modares University) for their encouragements and supports. 
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Moreover, the most recent challenge for Iranian economy consists of the 
US and UN sanctions which mostly have focused on restricting oil exports 
(boycott) and investment (embargo) in the oil related projects of Iran. It is 
likely that the sanctions will exacerbate the amount of oil revenues and 
consequently the budget deficit. This shows a dilemma to the policy makers 
who are trying to keep up the momentum into the economy by injecting more 
government expenditure into domestic economy while at the same time the oil 
revenues are uncertain and expected to decrease (compare Van Marrewijk and 
Van Bergeijk 1993). 
If policymakers understand the relationship between government 
expenditure and government revenue, continuous government deficits can be 
prevented. In the past decades the relationship between government 
expenditure and government revenue has attracted significant interest. Indeed 
this is because; the relationship between government revenue and expenditure 
has an impact on the budget deficit (Eita & Mbazima, 2008). 
Narayan and Narayan (2006) provide three reasons why the nature of the 
relationship between government expenditure and government revenue is 
important. First, if the revenue-spend hypothesis- which indicates that the 
causality runs from government revenue to government expenditure- holds, 
budget deficits can be avoided by implementing policies that stimulate 
government revenue. Second, if the spend-revenue hypothesis- which states 
that the causality runs from government expenditure to government revenue- 
holds it suggests that the government spends first and pay for this spending 
later by raising taxes. This will result in the fear of paying more taxes in the 
future and encourage the outflow of capital. Third, if the fiscal synchronization 
hypothesis- which states that the causality runs from both directions- does not 
hold, it suggests that government revenue decisions are made independent 
from government expenditure decisions. This can cause high budget deficits 
should government expenditure rise faster than government revenue.  
The causal relationship between government revenue and expenditure has 
remained an empirically debatable issue in the field of public finance. Many 
studies have considered links between government expenditures and 
government revenues but most have been conducted for countries where oil is 
not a major concern. In this paper I investigate the dynamic interrelationship 
between the government revenues and government expenditures in Iran as a 
developing oil export based economy.  This study wants to take a different 
approach to the fiscal policy issue as it deals with the government revenues and 
government expenditures for a petroleum economy where income, 
government revenue and exports are linked with oil revenue. 
Oil revenues in most oil-exporting countries are paid directly to the 
government as the guardian of the natural resources. Hence, the government 
becomes the conduit for the oil revenues into the economy. If the revenue is 
unstable and/or transitory, then the other macroeconomic variables will be 
unstable and the natural resource blessing could become a curse. Fiscal policy 
is therefore a key element, for most countries, in causing or preventing the 
resource curse (Devlin and Lewin, 2004). 
It seems that it will be more interesting if we consider the role of oil 
shocks on the government expenditures and government revenues link when 
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we are going to investigate their relationship in an oil exporting country like 
Iran. Moreover in this study I want to investigate how oil price (revenue) 
shocks are affecting the other major macroeconomic variables like money 
supply and domestic price levels through influencing the government revenues 
and government expenditures. Interestingly, the relationship between oil prices 
and levels of economic activity has been the subject of much attention for 
some time. Since the Arab oil embargo of 1973–1974 economists have been 
attracted by the relationship between oil price fluctuations and macroeconomic 
performance. Generally, the current literature on the impact of oil price 
fluctuations on the macroeconomy appears to be contradictory.  
Levin and Loungani (1996) argue that a country’s response to oil prices is 
determined by the choices of rules adopted by the country and those followed 
by its trading partners. Berument and Ceylan (2005) state that the impact of oil 
price changes depends on the structure of the economy and whether the 
country is a net oil exporter or importer; the net exporters of oil should benefit 
from the windfall profits and fiscal revenues created by oil price hikes, while 
the net importers of oil will experience this situation as additional burdens on 
their economies, and vice versa. 
However, Abeysinghe (2001) maintains that even net oil exporters cannot 
escape the negative influence of high oil prices. He states that while the direct 
impact of high oil prices on net oil exporters is positive, a negative effect is 
transmitted indirectly through a trade matrix. Hence, net exporters cannot 
escape the contractionary effect which is passed on through their trading 
partners and in the long run, the positive effects of high oil prices is mitigated. 
Generally, the current literature suffers from a paucity of research on the 
macroeconomic impact of oil price (revenue) fluctuations on a net oil exporter. 
Most of the empirical studies carried out have focused on the oil importing 
economies, particularly the developed economies. This study intends to fill this 
gap as well. In summary the purpose of this study is twofold. First, it 
investigates the government expenditure-government revenue nexus, I want to 
examine which of the three hypotheses, spend-and revenue, revenue-and-
spend or fiscal synchronization, is applicable to Iran. Unlike the previous 
studies I do not do this in a bivariate framework as is the usual approach; 
rather, given the characteristics of the Iranian economy, I consider how 
government expenditures and government revenues respond to an oil price 
(revenue) shock. Furthermore, while most of the existing researches in this 
area use only total government expenditures, this study will employ 
disaggregate government expenditures (current expenditures and capital 
expenditures) in addition to total expenditures. Second, I want to investigate 
how and to what extend the government expenditures and government 
revenues nexus can transfer the effects of oil shocks to the other Iranian key 
macroeconomic variables such as money supply and CPI. 
From the political view and regarding the current challenges of the Iranian 
economy for passing the negative effects of the international sanctions on its 
oil exports and foreign direct investment, the findings of this study are very 
important. In fact the results of this study helps to understand how sanctions 
via Iranian oil revenues, influence the government expenditures and thereby 
the wage bills of government employees, interest payment, employer 
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contribution including social security and pensions, subsidies and all other 
payments which are related to the government functions.  
Reviewing the literatures on the government expenditures-government 
revenues nexus and also the effects of oil price shocks on the economy reveals 
that the results of the previous studies have been very sensitive to the type of 
the variables, the time periods and econometric techniques. For avoiding this 
problem and in order to get robust support for the findings of this study I use 
two different groups of variables for two different time periods with three 
different econometrics models. For the first group of the variables (including 
oil prices, oil revenues to GDP ratio and government total expenditures to 
GDP ratio) I use a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model with 
imposing three long run restrictions to investigate the dynamic relationships of 
these variables with employing annual data for the period 1970-2008. For the 
second group of the variables (including oil revenues, government total 
revenues, government current and capital expenditures, money supply and 
CPI) I use the unrestricted Vector Autoregression (VAR) and Vector Error 
Correction (VEC) models with employing quarterly data for the period 1990:2-
2009:1. Furthermore techniques such as impulse response functions and 
variance decomposition analysis are used to trace the dynamic interactions of 
the variables. Such effects may not be captured in a static analysis. 
Section 2 reviews the previous studies on the relationship between 
government expenditures and government revenues and also some studies on 
the effects of oil shocks on the economy. Section 3 introduces the 
methodology of this research. Section4 includes the models which have been 
used in this study and also the results of their estimations. A discussion on the 
effectiveness of the sanctions on the Iranian economy based on the findings of 
this study has been included in section 5, and finally section 6 contains the 
summery and conclusions.  
2   Literature review 
The literature review is comprised of two parts. First part considers theories 
and empirical studies on the relationship between government revenues and 
government expenditures. In the second part I review some studies which have 
examined the effects of oil shocks on macroeconomic variables in some 
developing and developed countries. 
2.1 Literature on the relationship between government 
revenues and government expenditures 
There are different hypotheses regarding the relationship between government 
revenue and expenditure. The first of these is the revenue (tax)-spending 
hypothesis which maintains that a unidirectional causality runs from revenues 
to expenditures. This hypothesis is supported by Friedman (1978) and 
Buchanan and Wagner (1978). According to this hypothesis, the rise in tax 
revenues leads to an increase in government expenditures and consequently 
worsens the governmental budgetary balance. The view here is that if taxes are 
raised they will propel a growth in government spending. In other words, 
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government would spend all of its revenues, and therefore raising government 
revenues would lead to higher government expenditures. Friedman (1982) 
suggests cutting taxes as a remedy to budget deficits, since taxes have a positive 
causal impact on government expenditure. (Moalusi, 2004). 
Buchanan and Wagner (1978) stated that there is a negative causality from 
revenues to expenditure. They propose an increase in taxes revenue as remedy 
for budget deficits.  Their point of view is that with a cut in taxes the public 
will perceive that the cost of government programs has fallen. As a result they 
will demand more programs from the government which if undertaken will 
result in an increase in government spending (Moalusi, 2004).  
The second hypothesis known as spend-and- revenue (tax) hypothesis 
has been proposed by Peacock and Wiseman (1961, 1979). Under this 
hypothesis empirical results will show unidirectional causality running from 
government expenditures to government revenues. This view is based on their 
observation that any large-scale exogenous disturbances like wars and other 
unstable political conditions or natural disasters, will induce an increase in 
government spending and therefore an increase in tax revenues. The solution 
suggested here to problems of budget deficits is that government spending 
should be reduced, (Moalusi, 2004; Narayan, 2005). 
The fiscal synchronization hypothesis is the third school of thought. It 
argues that governments may change expenditure and taxes concurrently 
(Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Musgrave, 1966). This means that there is 
bidirectional causality between government expenditure and revenue. Under 
the fiscal synchronization hypothesis, citizens decide on the level of spending 
and taxes. This is done through comparing the benefits of government to 
citizen’s marginal cost, (Narayan, 2005).  
Finally, the fiscal neutrality school or institutional separation 
hypothesis, proposed by Baghestani and McNown (1994) argues that none of 
the above hypotheses describes the relationship between government revenues 
and expenditure. Government expenditure and revenues are each determined 
by the long run economic growth reflecting the institutional separation 
between government revenues and expenditure. 
Considerable empirical works have been done with respect to the above 
mentioned hypotheses. Using different econometric methods, studies have 
reached to different results. 
Fasano and Wang (2002), examine the direction of causality between total 
government expenditure and revenue in oil-dependent GCC countries for the 
period 1975-2000. A cointegration and error-correction modelling framework 
has been used. Their results show that government spending follows oil 
revenue, suggesting a pro-cyclical expenditure policy to variations in oil 
revenue. They suggest that to make budget expenditure less driven by revenue 
availability, the authorities could resort to a medium-term expenditure 
framework, so that expenditures can be planned and insulated from volatile 
short-term revenue availability. 
Narayan (2004), uses bounds testing approach to cointegration and the 
conventional F-test to examine causality between government revenue and 
government expenditure for nine Asian countries: India (1960-2000), 
Indonesia (1969-1999), Malaysia (1960-1996), Nepal (1960-1996), Pakistan 
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(1960-2000), Philippines (1960-2000), Sri Lanka (1960-2000), Thailand (1960-
2000), Singapore (1963-1995). His results on the direction of causation are 
mixed: (a) for Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka in the short-run and for Nepal 
in both the short- and long-run he finds support for the tax-and-spend 
hypothesis; (b) Indonesia and Sri Lanka are in conformity with the spend-and-
tax hypothesis in the long-run; and (c) for other countries there is evidence of 
neutrality. He concludes that in these countries ‘fiscal synchronization 
hypothesis’ is rejected and these Asian countries made expenditure decisions in 
isolation from revenue decisions. 
Moalusi (2004), examined the causal relationship between government 
spending and government revenue in the case of Botswana using annual data 
for the period 1976 to 2000. In addition to the bivariate model, he specifies a 
multivariate model incorporating GDP and interest rates.  His estimations 
show that there is a negative unidirectional causal link running from revenue to 
spending, therefore he concludes that government budget deficit can be 
corrected by raising taxes.  
Eita and Mbazima (2008), investigate the relationship between 
government revenue and government expenditure in Namibia using Granger 
causality test through cointegrated vector autoregression (VAR) methods for 
the period 1977 to 2007. The results show that there is unidirectional causality 
from revenue to expenditure. This suggests that unsustainable fiscal imbalances 
(deficit) can be mitigated by policies that stimulate government revenue.  
Mehrara et al. (2011), study the relationship between government revenue 
and government expenditure in 40 Asian countries for the period of 1995 to 
2008. They use GDP as a control variable into the model. They find a 
cointegration relationship between government revenue and government 
expenditure by applying Kao panel cointegration test. The causality tests 
indicate that there is a bidirectional causal relationship between government 
expenditure and revenues in both the long and the short run and fiscal 
synchronization hypothesis is confirmed. They recommend that the fiscal 
authorities of these countries with budget deficits should raise revenues and 
decrease spending simultaneously in order to control their budget deficits. 
Elyasi and Rahimi (2011), use annual data from 1963 to 2007, to 
investigate the relationship between government revenue and government 
expenditure in Iran by applying the bounds testing approach to cointegration, 
ARDL (autoregressive distributed lag) and the causality test. They find a 
cointegration relationship between government revenue, expenditure and 
GDP. However, applying the ECM version of the ARDL model shows that 
the error correction coefficient, which determines the speed of adjustment, has 
an expected and highly significant negative sign. Moreover, their results show 
that there is bidirectional causality from government revenue to government 
expenditure. So, these result consistent with the fiscal synchronization 
hypothesis. 
 Some more studies on the relationship between government expenditures 
and government revenues have been listed in table 2 by authors, periods, 
countries, methodologies and empirical results. 
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TABLE 2 
 Summary of some empirical studies  
on the government expenditures and revenues nexus 
Authors Countries studies Method Causality 
Direction 
Von Furstenberg et 
al. (1986)            
USA (Quarterly Data 1954-1982)                  VAR E → R   
Baghestani and 
McNown (1994)        
USA (Quarterly Data 1955-1989)                  ECM No 
Darrat  
(1998) 
Turkey ( 1967-1994)                       Engle-Granger and 
Johansen (1988)  
Cointegration test, CM             
R → E 
Nyamongo et al.  
(2007)                 
South Africa ( monthly data, 
October 1994 - June 2004)                    
Seasonal Unit Roots, 
Johanson     
Cointegration and 
VECM For Causality              
R ↔ E in long-run  
 
No  in short-run   
Chang and Chiang  
(2009)                        
15 OECD countries (1992-2006)                                                              Panel Cointegration 
and Panel Granger 
Causality                            
R ↔ E
 
Li (2001)                                   China (1950-1997)                            Cointegration and ECM R ↔ E 
Barua  
(2005)                                      
Bangladesh (1974-2004) Johansen test and 
VECM                 
No in short run 
Hong  
(2009) 
Malaysia (1970-2007)                        Johansen cointegration 
and ECM 
E→ R 
Ho and Huang  
(2009)                
31 Chinese provinces (1999 to 
2005)       
multivariate panel error 
correction model          
No in short run 
R ↔ E 
Afonso and Rault  
(2009)                   
EU countries(1960-2006)                          panel analysis                           (Italy, France, 
Spain, Greece 
and Portugal 
(E→R)) 
(Germany, 
Belgium, Austria, 
Finland and the 
UK (R→E)) 
Note: Abbreviations are defined as follows: VAR=Vector Autoregressive Model, VEC=Vector Error 
Correction Model, ECM=Error Correction Model, R=government revenues, E=government expenditures. 
In this study I investigate the dynamic relationship between government 
expenditures and government revenues in Iran. Government expenditures in 
both aggregate and disaggregate form will be used moreover I will try to 
include other variables like money supply and CPI in my VAR model. In 
addition I consider the effects of oil shock on the mentioned relationship as an 
important factor in Iranian economy. I try to assess the contribution of the 
shocks to oil revenues and total revenues to the variations in government 
expenditures and vice versa.  
2.2 Literature on the effects of oil shocks on the economy 
Oil price (revenue) shocks receive considerable attention for their presumed 
macroeconomic consequences. As the main focus of research directed towards 
net oil importers and developed economies, there is a paucity of such studies 
for developing, oil- exporting countries. Generally, there appears to be little 
consensus in the current literature on the macroeconomic impact of oil 
fluctuations. Pioneering work on oil price effects carried out by Darby (1982) 
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and Hamilton (1983) focused on the US economy. While Darby was not able 
to identify a significant relationship between oil prices and macroeconomic 
variables, Hamilton found that oil price shocks were an important factor in 
almost all US recessions from 1949 to 1973. He concludes that changes in oil 
prices Granger-caused changes in unemployment and GNP in the US 
economy. 
Hess (2000) observes that oil price shocks led to lower real gross domestic 
product (GDP) prior to the 1980s. Since that time, changes in oil prices had no 
effect on US economic activity. He concludes that oil price spikes are generally 
short-lived and may not even have a direct effect on US economic activity. 
Furthermore, Hess notes that oil prices became more volatile in the 1980s and 
1990s relative to real GDP. Blanchard and Gali (2007) claim the main reasons 
behind the weak response of economies to oil shocks in recent years are 
smaller energy intensity, a more flexible labor market, and improvements in 
monetary policies. 
Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2004) assess empirically the effects of oil 
price shocks on the real economic activities in a sample of seven OECD 
countries, Norway and the Euro area as a whole. Their results show that oil 
price increases have a larger impact on GDP growth than oil price declines. 
They emphasized the difference between oil importing and oil exporting 
countries. They conclude that oil price increases have a negative impact on 
economic activity for oil-importing countries, while the relationship for oil-
exporting countries is mixed. UK’s economy, according to them exhibits a 
surprising behavior: while it is expected that an oil price shock has positive 
effects on the GDP growth for a net oil exporting country, an oil price increase 
of 100% actually leads to a loss of British GDP growth rate of more than 1% 
after the first year in all specifications. 
The transmission mechanisms of oil shocks to the economy mostly in the 
advanced, oil importing countries are the supply effect, the demand effect and 
the terms of trade effect (Brown et al., 2004; Schneider, 2004; Lardic and 
Mignon, 2006; Sill, 2007; Jbir and Zouari-Ghorbel, 2009). On the supply side, 
increased oil prices result in a reduction of an input for production and this 
leads to higher production costs, thus leading to a slowdown of output and 
productivity. On the demand side, higher oil prices increase the general level of 
prices and with a reduction in real income available for consumption, demand 
falls (Farzanegan and Markwardt, 2009). On the terms of trade side, oil-
importing countries face worsening terms of trade conditions as demand falls 
in these countries and this results in wealth transfer from oil-importing to oil-
exporting countries (Iwayemi and Fowowe, 2010). 
For oil-exporting countries, different conclusions are expected because oil 
price hikes will increase foreign exchange earnings and lead to higher domestic 
demand although it has been argued that slower global demand will dampen 
the benefits to oil-exporting countries (Schneider, 2004). Recently, a few 
studies have attempted to examine the role of oil shocks on the economies of 
oil-exporting countries. 
El-Anashasy (2006) examined the effects of oil price shocks on 
Venezuela's economic performance over 1950 to 2001. He used a cointegrated 
vector autoregression (CVAR) approach to analyze the short run dynamics and 
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the long run relationships among oil prices, government revenues, government 
consumption, investment and output. His findings show that oil prices and 
investment are the main determinants of GDP level in the long run and that 
public investment is the only avenue through which fiscal policy could affect 
long run GDP level or growth. He argues that oil price shocks may have a 
secondary, indirect effect on the level of output via the fiscal channel because 
investment responds to any fiscal disequilibrium caused by an initial shock. 
Eltony and Al-Awadi (2001), use quarterly data for the period 1984-1998 
to examine the impact of oil price fluctuations on key macroeconomic 
variables for the Kuwaiti economy. The results of the vector autoregression 
(VAR) and vector error correction (VEC) models indicate that oil price shocks 
and hence oil revenues have a notable impact on government expenditure, 
both development and current. However, government development 
expenditure has been influenced relatively more. The results also point out the 
significance of the CPI in explaining a notable part of the variations of both 
types of government expenditure. On the other hand, the variations in value of 
imports are mostly due to the oil revenue fluctuations and also the fluctuation 
in government development expenditures. The results from the VECM 
approach indicate that a significant part of LM2 variance is explained by the 
variance in oil revenue.  
Olomola and Adejumo (2006), examined the effect of oil price shock on 
output, inflation, the real exchange rate and the money supply in Nigeria using 
quarterly data from 1970 to 2003. Using a VAR model they indicate that oil 
price shocks do not have substantial effects on output and inflation rate in 
Nigeria. However, oil price shocks do significantly influence the real exchange 
rates. The implication is that a high real oil price may give rise to wealth effect 
that appreciates the real exchange rate. This may squeeze the tradable sector, 
giving rise to the “Dutch Disease ”.2 They conclude that oil price shock is an 
important determinant of real exchange rates and in the long run money 
supply, while money supply rather than oil price shocks that affects output 
growth in Nigeria. 
Farzanegan and Markwardt  (2009), analyze the dynamic relationship 
between oil price shocks and major macroeconomic variables in Iran by 
applying a VAR approach. Their full sample comprises quarterly observations 
for the 1975:II-2006:IV period. Their main results examine the post-war period 
(1989:I–2006:IV) and for the robustness check, they compare these results 
with the pre-1989 period (1975:II–1988:IV). They analyze the effects of oil 
price shocks in three different channels: the supply side, the demand side, and 
the terms of trade. Their results on the supply side of economy reveal that 
positive oil price shocks stimulate Iranian industrial production and real 
imports. On the other hand, negative shocks on oil prices undermine the 
process of real industrial production and play a significant role in lowering the 
real level of imports. On the demand side, both positive and negative oil price 
shocks have inflationary effects and drive up the general level of prices. Their 
                                                
2 Economist use the term “Dutch disease” to describe a reduction in a country’s 
export performance as a result of an appreciation of the exchange rate after a natural 
resource such as oil has been discovered (See Barder, 2006). 
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results show just a marginal impact of oil price fluctuations on real government 
expenditures. They conclude that increasing oil prices improves the terms of 
trade and appreciates the real effective exchange rate. 
Mehrara and Oskoui (2007), study the sources of macroeconomic 
fluctuations in four oil-exporting countries using annual data: (Iran, 1970–
2002; Indonesia, 1970–2002; Kuwait, 1972–2002; Saudi Arabia, 1971–2002). 
They use a structural VAR approach and by imposing long-run restrictions on 
a VAR model, four structural shocks are identified: nominal demand, real 
demand, supply, and oil price shocks. Their results show that oil price shocks 
are the main source of output fluctuations in Saudi Arabia and Iran, but not in 
Kuwait and Indonesia. They claim this is because of the relatively successful 
experience of Kuwait in the use of stabilization and savings fund and the right 
structural reforms particularly diversifying away from resource-based 
production in Indonesia. 
Regarding to the differences in the results of the previous studies in this 
study I use two different groups of variables with two different time periods 
(quarterly and annually) to investigate the robustness and reliability of the 
results and to provide a more comprehensive base for comparison against 
different methodologies. For this purpose I use a variety of econometrics 
models (SVAR, VAR, VEC) to investigate the dynamic relationships and 
interactions among the variables.  
3  Methodology 
To reach the purposes of this study some helpful econometrics techniques 
such as vector autoregression model (VAR), vector error correction model 
(VECM) and structural vector autoregression model (SVAR) and some useful 
tools on these techniques such as impulse response functions and variance 
decomposition are used. 
The linear dynamic vector autoregression (VAR) method has presented by 
Sims (1980).  Sometimes, economic theory may not be adequate to determine 
the specific relationship between variables. According to Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld (1991), there are times when it is more logical to allow the data to 
specify the dynamics in a relationship. VAR makes little or no theoretical 
demands on the structure of the relationships in a model. VAR helps 
researchers to understand interrelationships among economic variables 
(Enders, 1996). Maddala (1992) notes that the VAR model is a critical starting 
point in the analysis of interrelationships among different time series. Darnell 
and Evans (1990) observe that the VAR model provides a straightforward 
method of producing forecasts that do not discern on how the variables in the 
model affect one another. The mathematical representation of a VAR is: 
 
ttptptt BxyAyAy ε++++= −− ...11  1 
 
Where ty is a k vector of endogenous variables, tx  is a d vector of exogenous 
variables, pAA ,...,1 and B are matrices of coefficients to be estimated, and tε  is 
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a vector of innovations that may be contemporaneously correlated but are 
uncorrelated with their own lagged values and uncorrelated with all of the 
right-hand side variables. Since only lagged values of the endogenous variables 
appear on the right-hand side of the equations, simultaneity is not an issue and 
OLS yields consistent estimates. Moreover, even though the innovations tε  
may be contemporaneously correlated, OLS is efficient and equivalent to GLS 
since all equations have identical regressors. 
In the standard VAR, disturbances are generally characterized by 
contemporaneous correlations which it causes the response of the system to an 
innovation in one of the variables be the response of all those variables that are 
contemporaneously correlated with it. However, this contemporaneous 
correlation is purged by the Cholesky orthogonalization procedure. 
For the first group of the variables in this study I use a Structural Vector 
Autoregressive (SVAR) modelling approach while for the second group of the 
variables, unrestricted Vector Autoregressive (VAR) and Vector Error 
Correction (VEC) models are used. The advantage of the SVAR over the other 
classes of vector autoregressive models is that it has better empirical fit and 
allows identifying structural shocks with respect to economic theory. 
Furthermore, SVAR also makes it possible to examine the net effects of 
unexpected change in one or more variables on other variables in the system 
(Chukuet al., 2011). SVAR models are more suited to track and identify 
structural shocks with respect to underlying economic theory (Chukuet al., 
2011). Hence, sometimes it is necessary to impose relevant restrictions on the 
system of equations to retrieve structural shocks of the model. On the other 
hand, the unrestricted VAR models are sometimes superior to the structural 
VAR models since the latter models are “very often misspecified” (Tijerina-
Guajardo and Pagán, 2003). The VAR model is a dynamic simultaneous 
equation system which is free of a prior restriction on the structure of the 
model. The VECM is basically a VAR system that builds on Johansen's test for 
cointegration and is usually referred to in the literatures as the restricted VAR.  
Indeed a vector error correction model (VEC) is a restricted VAR designed for 
use with non-stationary series that are known to be cointegrated. The VEC has 
cointegration relations built into the specification so that it restricts the long-
run behavior of the endogenous variables to converge to their cointegrating 
relationships while allowing for short-run adjustment dynamics. The main 
applied tools in the VAR and SVAR models estimation are the impulse 
response functions (IRFs) and the variance decomposition analyses (VDC).  
The dynamic response of macroeconomic variables to innovations in a 
particular variable can be traced out using the simulated responses of the 
estimated VAR system (Impulse Response Functions (IRF)). Thus, the IRF 
allows us to examine the dynamic effects of shocks to a particular variable (for 
example oil revenues) on the other macroeconomic variables. Through IRF we 
can observe the magnitude and statistical significance of such responses to one 
standard deviation increase in oil market related variable error (see Stock and 
Watson, 2001 for more details on IRF). An examination of the entire system is 
studied by analyzing the variance decomposition of the system. A variance 
decomposition assigns the variance of forecast errors in a given variable to 
self-shocks, as well as those of the other variables in the VAR (Brown and 
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Yücel, 1999). The Choleski decomposition method is adopted, in order to 
construct the variance decompositions. 
 For the most part, the Cholesky procedure implicitly assumes recursivity 
in the VAR model as it is estimated. Although theoretical considerations may 
help in determining the order of the variables in the VAR model and ex-post 
sensitivity analysis may further help provide insights regarding appropriate 
ordering, it remains largely at the discretion of the modeller (Eltony and Al-
Alwadi, 2001). To determine the appropriate number of lag length of the VAR 
model, following Judge at al. (1988) and McMillin(1988), I use the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). The chosen lag length is one that minimizes the 
following: 
 
TndInnAIC
n
/)2(det)( 2+= ∑  2 
 
Where d is the number of variables in the model, T the sample size and ∑n  an 
estimate of the residuals’ variance-covariance matrix  ∑n obtained with a VAR 
(n). 
Furthermore in this study I use Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-
Perron unit root tests in order to establish the order of integration of the 
variables. 
4 Modeling and empirical results 
In this study I will use two different groups of the variables. For the first group 
of the variables (including oil prices, oil revenues to GDP ratio and 
government total expenditures to GDP ratio) I use a Structural Vector 
Autoregression (SVAR) model and for the second group of the variables 
(including oil revenues, government total revenues, government current and 
capital expenditures, money supply and CPI) I use the unrestricted Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) and Vector Error Correction (VEC) models. 
4.1 An SVAR model for the first group of the variables 
By constructing a Structural Vector Autoregression model I want to know how 
oil revenues and government expenditures to GDP ratios respond to oil price 
shocks, and moreover hove government expenditures to GDP ratio responds 
to oil revenue shocks. My SVAR model for Iran contains three variables: oil 
prices (LOPt), the ratio of the oil revenues to GDP (LOILRGDP) and the 
ratio of the government total expenditures to GDP (LTEGDP). All data are 
transformed to logarithms to eliminate the problem of heteroskedasticity (L 
represents the Log). 
Three structural shocks are considered: oil price shocks OPtε  , oil revenue 
shocks OILRtε  and government total expenditure shocks
TE
tε . 
The three-component structural VAR model can be written as: 
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Where iA  are matrices in the lag operator, L; aij’s are the estimated coefficients 
and L indicates a lag operator such that ∑== − K
k
ijkijktt
k LALAyyL )(;
 
denotes the sum of the moving average coefficients for (k=1,…….,p) where p 
is the degree of the polynomial Aij(L) or the optimal lag order of the VAR 
model; and 




=
TEOILROP
t εεεε are the structural shocks. 
Changes in our three variables of interest are functions of present and past 
values of the structural shocks. If all the variables are non-stationary integrated 
I (1) variables, stationary is obtained by taking first differences. A reduced form 
moving average (MA) representation can be written as: 
 
tt eLCZ )(=∆  4 
 
where Zt is a 3x1 vector containing oil prices, the ratio of the oil revenues to 
GDP and the ratio of the government total expenditures to GDP; 
...)( 22100 +++== ∑
∞
=
LCLCCLCLC
t
t t  
is a 3x3 matrix of polynomials in 
the lag operator L and et is a 3x1 vector of the residuals. 
With
 
tt Ae ε0=
 
I can identify the model with knowledge of A0. There are nine 
elements in A0. The variance-covariance matrix of )( ′tt eeE provides six 
equations to solve for these nine unknowns and therefore, three restrictions 
are needed to be imposed on the model. I use the following three long-run 
restrictions:  
1. Oil prices in the long-run are determined by world demand and supply. 
Thus, both oil revenues and government expenditures have no long run 
impact on oil prices: 
 
01312 == aa  5 
 
012 =a    means oil revenues shocks have no long run effect on the oil price. 
means government expenditures shocks have no long run effect on 
the  oil price. 
 
2. Also oil revenues are exogenously determined. As a member of OPEC, 
Iran has no control over the price of its crude oil and at least theoretically 
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speaking cannot exceed its assigned production quota. Thus government 
expenditures have no long run effect on oil revenues3: 
 
023 =a  6 
 
023 =a  means government expenditures shocks have no long run effects on  
oil revenues. 
Equation (3) can be rewritten as: 
 
 
7 
 
Which is lower triangular. 
By using the model 7, I will calculate variance decompositions. From 
variance decomposition results, I can examine how shocks to oil revenues 
affect the government expenditures. Moreover, I can see how both respond to 
oil price shocks. 
In order to capture the effect of the Iran/Iraq war period (1980-1988) as 
an important structural break in Iran’s economy an intercept shift dummy 
variable D(80) has been included in the model which D(80) is equal to 1 if 
(t>1980) and zero otherwise.  
 
4.1.1 The results of the SVAR model for first group of the 
variables 
Contingent on availability and quality of data for my SVAR model, I use 
annual data for the period 1970-2008 to investigate the short and long run 
relationship between oil revenues to GDP ratio (OILRGDP) and government 
total expenditures to GDP ratio (TEGDP) and also the effects of oil price 
shocks on this relationship in Iran. The data is obtained from the Central Bank 
of Iran (CBI) and the Energy Information Administration (EIA). 
Figure 1 shows the ratios of government oil revenues to GDP and 
government total expenditures to GDP in Iran. 
                                                
3 - Oil revenues depend on the production of oil and global oil prices. Global oil 
prices are determined to a great extent on international markets, but the level of oil 
production in Iran depends to some deal on the amount of domestic and foreign 
investments in oil fields, new extractions and the increasing capacity of current 
production. But I assume that in fact the amount of oil export is determined by 
OPEC and therefore oil revenues to a large extent are determined exogenously.  
























=










∆
∆
∆
TE
OILR
OP
LaLaLa
LaLa
La
LTEGDP
LOILRGDP
LOP
ε
ε
ε
)()()(
0)()(
00)(
)(
)(
)(
333131
2221
11
19 
FIGURE 1 
 Ratios of Government total expenditures and oil revenues to GDP in Iran 
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The calculated raw correlation between government total expenditures and 
government oil revenues is about 0.88, indicating that oil revenues and 
government expenditures are highly correlated with each other in Iranian 
economy.  
 
Unit root tests 
I use the ADF (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) and Phillips-Perron tests in order to 
establish the order of integration of the variables. These tests include a 
constant but not a time trend, as recommended by Dickey and Fuller (1979). 
As illustrated in table 3, all of the variables are non-stationary in their level at 
five per cent and one per cent confidence levels. According to the results of 
Phillips-Perron and ADF tests all of the variables are integrated of order 1, i.e. 
I(1). 
TABLE 3 
 ADF and Phillips-Perron unit root tests 
Variable ADF Phillips-Perron 
 Level 1st diff Level 1st diff 
LOP -2.24 -6.37*** -2.21 -6.37*** 
LOILRGDP -1.88 -6.12*** -2.07 -6.12*** 
LTEGDP -1.08 -5.19*** -1.36 -5.28*** 
 Critical Value 1% -3.61 -3.62 -3.61 -3.62 
Critival Value 5% -2.94 -2.94 -2.94 -2.94 
***: Null hypothesis rejection at 1% 
 
However, usually the question arises whether one should use the variables in 
the VAR (or SVAR) system in levels or in their differences. Generally speaking, 
if all the variables in the system are non-stationary, it is better to use a VAR in 
levels. On the other hand, estimating a VAR in the levels in the case of 
cointegration may lead to the neglect of important constraints. Doan et al. 
(1984) noted that differencing a variable is important in the case of Box-
Jenkins ARIMA Modelling. Doan et al. also observed that it is not desirable to 
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do so in VAR models. Fuller (1976) has also shown that differencing the data 
may not produce any gain so far as the asymptotic efficiency of the VAR is 
concerned even if it is appropriate. Moreover, Fuller has argued that 
differencing a variable throws information away while producing no significant 
gain. Therefore following the mentioned discussion in this study I use the level 
of the variables rather than their differences. 
 
Variance Decompositions (VD) 
Variance decomposition allows researchers to attribute the variation of 
different macroeconomic variables to the underlying shocks. Thus, VD 
provides information about the relative importance of each shock in affecting 
the variable in the VAR (SVAR). 
According to Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), I choose 1 as the order 
of the SVAR model.  Since the estimates of individual coefficients in VAR 
(SVAR) models do not have a straightforward interpretation, they are not 
reported here. For stability of my model the figure 2 shows the AR graph 
which reports the inverse roots of the characteristic AR polynomial (see 
Lütkepohl, 1991). The estimated VAR (SVAR) is stable (stationary) if all roots 
have modulus less than one and lie inside the unit circle. If the VAR is not 
stable, certain results (such as impulse response standard errors) are not valid 
(QMS, 2010). Figure 2 represents that my SVAR model is stable. 
FIGURE 2 
 Inverse roots of AR characteristic Polynomial 
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Table 4 shows the per cent of forecast error variance attributable to each 
shock. From this table we can see that for the most part, after ten years, about 
83 per cent of the variance in oil prices and about 64 per cent of variation in oil 
revenues to GDP ratio are explained by the variables themselves that are 
inductive of their exogenous nature. Table 4 shows that for government total 
expenditures to GDP ratio in the first two years and for oil prices and oil 
revenues to GDP ratio in all years, the biggest portion of variations is typically 
explained by variables’ own trend. This implies that the historical trend of each 
variable explains a large part of its own variations. 
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 TABLE 4 
Variance decomposition 
 
LOP LOILRGDP   LTEGDP 
Variance decomposition of LOP   
1 Year 100.00                    0.00 0.00 
2 Years 97.54                      2.05                          0.39 
 5 Years                 88.37   9.07              2.54 
8 Years                 83.7 11.9                          4.39 
10 Years 82.18 12.52 5.28 
Variance decomposition of LOILRGDP   
  
1 Year 5.95                       94.04                        0.00 
2 Years 4.13                     95.84                        0.01 
5 Years                 15.56                 83.79 0.64 
8 Years                 27.98                     70.02    1.98 
10 Years               33.28                     63.82                        2.88 
Variance decomposition of LTEGDP   
  
1 Year 1.48                      14.39                        84.14 
2 Years                  1.19                       26.88                       71.91 
5 Years                  15.12                     48.24                       36.63 
8 Years 31.73 47.52 20.73 
        10 Years 38.98 44.29 16.71 
 
Oil price shocks play an important role in explaining the variation of oil 
revenues to GDP ratio and also the variation of government expenditures to 
GDP ratio in the long run (Its contributions in explaining the shocks to 
LOILRGDP and LTEGDP are about 34 and 39 per cent in 10th year).  
Oil revenue shocks explain relatively big parts of the variations in the 
government expenditures to GDP ratio both in the short run and long run 
(almost 15 per cent after 1 year and 45 per cent after 10 years) indicating that 
government expenditure movements in Iran are heavily depended on oil 
revenue shocks so that in the long run the contribution of oil revenues in 
explaining the variations in government expenditures to GDP ratio is more 
than its own contribution in explaining its variations. Therefore a strong 
causality is running from LOILRGDP to LTEGDP. 
Logically the contribution of government expenditure shocks in explaining 
the variations of the oil revenues to GDP ratio is very marginal. This implies 
that as I discussed before oil revenues in Iranian economy are determined 
exogenously. 
Also the results of the table 4 show that the contribution of oil revenue 
shocks in explaining the government expenditure variations is stronger than 
the contribution of oil price shocks in explaining government expenditure 
variations (in all periods).  This means that oil revenue shocks are better 
contributors in explaining the variations in government expenditures. 
Therefore because of this reason and also because of the consistency of my 
time series data for the second group of the variables in this study I will use the 
oil revenue shocks as a proxy for oil shocks rather than oil price shocks.  
Impulse response functions 
In figure 3, the impulse response functions trace out the response of current 
and future values of the government expenditures to GDP ratio (LTEGDP) to 
a one standard deviation increase in the current value of oil prices and oil 
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revenues errors. Runkle (1987) emphasizes the construction and report of 
confidence bands around the impulse responses in the VAR models. Following 
Sims and Zha (1999), 68% confidence intervals for the IRFs are estimated in 
this study. To build these confidence bands, 1000 Monte Carlos simulations 
are employed. The middle line in IRFs displays the response of each variable to 
a one standard deviation shock in impulse variable. The dotted lines represent 
confidence bands. When the horizontal line in the IRFs falls between 
confidence bands, the impulse responses are not statistically significant. In 
other words, the null hypothesis of “no effects of impulse variable shocks” on 
the specific variable cannot be rejected (Berument et al., 2010). The horizontal 
line in IRFs shows the time period after the initial shock. The vertical line in 
IRFs shows the magnitude of response to shocks. Figure 3, shows that the 
innovations to oil revenues are found to have statistically significant and 
positive effects on the government expenditures to GDP ratio (LTEGDP) for 
the first 8 years after shock. But the shocks to the oil prices can not affect 
LTEGDP significantly. 
Most of the studies for considering the effects of oil shocks on the other 
macroeconomic variables have used the oil price as an impulse variable but 
sometimes their results are not consistent. In one hand some studies like Mork 
(1989), Hamilton (1996), Cunado and Perez de Garcia (2003) could find the 
significant effects of the oil price shocks on the macroeconomy, but on the 
other hand some other studies such as Darby (1982) and Hooker (1996) show 
the insignificant effects of oil price shocks on macroeconomic variables. 
According to the figure 3, my results show that in the case of a developing oil 
export based economy like Iran, using the oil revenue shocks for explaining the 
government expenditures variations can be better contributor rather than using 
oil price shocks. 
FIGURE 3 
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Furthermore, figure 4 represents the shocks to the government total 
expenditures don’t have significant effect on the government oil revenues to 
GDP ratio. Therefore according to the results of figures 3 and 4, I can say that 
there is unidirectional causality from oil revenues to GDP ratio (LOILRGDP) 
to government total expenditures to GDP ratio (LTEGDP) in Iranian 
economy.  
FIGURE 4 
 Response of LOILRGDP to Cholesky one S.D. LTEGDP Innovation 
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4.2 A VAR model for the second group of the variables 
With considering the availability and the consistency of the existent data, I use 
a VAR model with six variables to examine the impact of oil shocks on the 
relationship between government revenues and government expenditures. I 
use the government expenditures in its disaggregated form by dividing it into 
two categories: government capital expenditures and government current 
expenditures4. The variables in the second model consist of one external shock 
measured by innovations in oil revenues (OILR), three policy variables, money 
supply (M2), government current expenditures (CURE) and government 
capital expenditures (CAPE) and two other key macroeconomic variables, 
government total revenues (TR) and the consumer price index (CPI). I use the 
logarithmic form of the variables; this can reduce the scale of the variables, 
which is a desirable quality when analyzing the time-series properties of the 
variables before their relationship can be established. In the VAR model, I will 
adopt the following ordering of the variables (L represents the Log); LOILR, 
LTR, LCURE, LCAPE, LM2, LCPI. The first variable in the Cholesky 
ordering is usually the variable with the largest expectation or the most 
evidence for exogeneity among the variables of the VAR system. This 
ordering, indicates that oil revenues have an influence on total revenues and 
then later on all other variables in the model. While the oil revenues are deeply 
depended on oil prices, then its behavior is the least determined by other 
variables included in the model. Oil prices and consequently oil revenues are 
largely determined by the world market conditions rather than within the 
                                                
4 - Capital expenditures are used to expand the current capacity of the government, 
while current expenditures try to preserve the current capacities of government 
administration. 
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Iranian economy. Also, this ordering reflects that government expenditures are 
largely determined by government revenues, which is a plausible assumption 
with regard to characteristics of Iran as a developing oil export based economy.  
Unlike, Eltony and Al-Awadi, I set the government current expenditures 
before government capital expenditures. Following Farzanegan’s discussion 
(2011) I assume that capital expenditures are more flexible than current 
expenditures (So the exogeneity of current expenditures is more than the 
exogeneity of capital expenditures). Farzanegan argues that current 
expenditures are needed to manage and maintain new investments which are 
financed by capital expenditures. Thus, they are to some deal inflexible and 
sticky downward. In the case of increasing oil revenues, the current 
expenditures also go up because of the larger size of government. When oil 
prices go down, however, the government is not able reduce the size of its 
activities immediately, leading to a significant budget deficit. By contrast 
Farzanegan(2011), claims that capital expenditures are sensitive to fluctuation 
of oil revenues.  
Similarly I assume that money supply is determined by government 
expenditures and according to previous studies for Iran, I suppose that money 
supply and government expenditures and revenues are determinant factors for 
the domestic price level (CPI).  
 
4.2.1 The results of the VAR model for the second group of the 
variables 
For the second group of the variables in this study, I use quarterly data for the 
period 1990:2-2009:1. All data are from the central bank of Iran (CBI). In 
contrast to my earlier estimation period this period is not included the war 
between Iran and Iraq. 
 
Unit root tests 
As illustrated in table 5, all variables are non-stationary in their level at five per 
cent and one per cent confidence levels. The results show that ADF and 
Phillips-Perron t-values for all of the variables in level are greater than critical 
values. According to the results of Phillips-Perron test all of the variables are 
integrated of order 1, i.e. I(1), but the results of the ADF test show that while 
LCPI and LM2 are integrated of order 2, i.e. I(2) other variables are integrated 
of order 1, i.e. I(1).  
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TABLE 5 
 ADF and Phillips-Perron unit root test   
Variable ADF Phillips-Perron 
 Level 1st diff 2nd diff Level 1st diff 
LOILR -1.53 -9.3*** - -2.63 -24.26*** 
LTR -1.76 -9.03*** - -2.02 -21.02*** 
LCAPE -0.58 -4.76*** - -1.74 -32.66*** 
LCURE -2.07 -10.48*** - -1.21 -30.66*** 
LM2 -1.76 -1.12 -22.59*** -1.28 -17.69*** 
LCPI -2.11 -2.03 -4.73*** -2.23 -5.78*** 
Critical Value 1% -3.52 -3.52 -3.52 -3.53 -3.53 
Critical Value 5% -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 
***: Null hypothesis rejection at 1% 
Variance Decompositions (VD) 
According to the discussion which I had for the first model I use the level of 
the variables for the VAR model rather than their first differences. According 
to Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), I choose 2 as the order of my VAR 
model.                               
The next step is to estimate the VAR. The estimates of individual 
coefficients in VAR do not have a straightforward interpretation so they are 
not reported here. Also I have examined the diagnostic statistics of the 
estimated VAR model. For stability of my model Figure 5 shows the AR graph 
which reports the inverse roots of the characteristic AR polynomial (see 
Lütkepohl, 1991). This figure shows that in the VAR model all roots have 
modulus less than one and lie inside the unit circle and the VAR model is 
stable. 
FIGURE 5 
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Table 6 presents the variance decomposition for the 10-quarters forecasts. 
Variance Decomposition separates the variation in an endogenous variable into 
the component shocks to the VAR. The table shows that almost for all of the 
variables the biggest portion of variations is typically explained by the variables’ 
own trend in the first quarter. This implies that, at the beginning, the historical 
trend of each variable explains a large part of its own variations. The exception 
is for government total revenues (LTR), as about 77 per cent of its variations 
in the first quarter are explained by oil revenues. This can attribute to the 
highly dependency of government revenues on oil revenues. For the most part, 
after ten quarters, about 80 per cent of the variance in oil revenues is explained 
by the variable itself which is inductive of its exogenous nature.  
 The contribution of government current expenditure shocks to 
government total revenue shocks was about 2 per cent in the fourth quarter 
rising marginally to about 3 per cent in the tenth quarter. Also shocks to 
government capital expenditures contributed an average of 1.15 per cent to 
total government revenue shocks over from the 8th quarter to the 10th 
quarter. This implies that government revenues in Iran are highly depended on 
oil revenues and the variations in government expenditures (both capital and 
current) cannot contribute to the government revenues variations significantly, 
therefore the causality which is running from government expenditures to 
government revenues is expected to be very weak. Also the contributions of 
money supply and LCPI in explaining the shocks to the government revenues 
are negligible.  
The big part of the variations in government capital expenditures is 
explained by itself in all quarters. However the shocks to government total 
revenues also affect the shocks to the government capital expenditures very 
significantly. As evidenced in table 6, shocks to government total revenues 
explained about 14 per cent of shocks to the government capital expenditure in 
the 1st quarter increasing to about 35 per cent in 10th quarter. This implies 
that a considerable causality can exist from government revenues to 
government capital expenditures. In addition to the results show, government 
current expenditures and money supply variations are relatively significant 
contributors to forecast errors in government capital expenditures. 
Looking at the variance decomposition of government current 
expenditures, it is apparent that a noticeable part of its variance is explained by 
the variance in government total revenues (about 65 per cent in 10th quarter). 
This shows that there is a strong causality running from government total 
revenues to government current expenditures. Also the results indicate that oil 
revenues are important contributors to forecast errors in government current 
expenditures.  
An interesting point is that oil revenue variations can explain a larger share 
of current expenditure movements compared to capital expenditure 
movements, indicating that the shocks to oil prices and consequently oil 
revenues mostly affect the government current expenditures rather than its 
capital expenditures. Also the contribution of government total revenue shocks 
in explaining the shocks to LCURE is more than its contribution in explaining 
the shocks to LCAPE. This result is to some extent in opposition to my earlier 
assumption and Farzanegan’s discussion (2011) for considering the capital 
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expenditures more flexible than the current expenditures. Maybe this is 
because we need to consider the effects of oil shocks asymmetrically. In other 
words: maybe we need to distinguish between positive and negative oil revenue 
changes. Because the government current expenditures are only sticky 
downward but in the case of increasing oil revenues, the current expenditures 
also go up because of the larger size of government. So in the case of 
increasing oil revenues the government current expenditures have possibility to 
be flexible even more than capital expenditures. An alternative explanation is 
that the government capital expenditures are often allocated to long run 
projects and government defines the financial resources of these projects 
beforehand. This can to some deal decrease the effects of the current situation 
and current oil revenue shocks on this kind of expenditures, while the current 
expenditures can be more affected by current changes in revenues. 
Shocks to LCPI have insignificant contributions to both government 
current and capital expenditure variations in all periods. LCPI shocks 
contributed about 0.4 and 0.8 per cent respectively to government capital and 
current expenditure shocks in 10th quarter. 
Moreover, forecast errors in money supply other than its own variations 
are mostly due to variations in government total revenues and government 
current expenditures. The implication of this result is that money supply is 
highly influenced by government revenues and government current 
expenditures in Iran.  
 For LCPI, the largest source of shocks in ending quarters was changes in 
government total revenues, which contributed about 38 per cent in the 8th 
quarter and about 46 per cent in the 10th quarter. The contribution of 
government current expenditure shocks to LCPI violability was about 13 per 
cent on average in the 8th and 10th quarters and this is considerable. Also 
shocks to money supply, explained about 25 per cent of shocks to the LCPI in 
the 4th quarter declining in effects to about 13 and 10 per cent in 8th and 10th 
quarters. The implication of this finding is that government total revenues, 
government current expenditures and money supply are important 
determinants for inflation in Iran. According to the table 6 in the short run 
(first quarter) after its own variations the money supply variations are the most 
important factors in determining the shocks to the price levels in Iran, while in 
the long run (after 10 quarters) government total revenues and government 
current expenditures are respectively the most important factors. 
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TABLE 6 
 Vector autoregression (VAR) estimates variance decomposition 
 LOILR LTR LCURE LCAPE LM2 LCPI 
Variance decomposition of LOILR 
    
1/QTR 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
4/QTR 87.19 6.12 1.4 1.76 0.57 2.93 
8/QTR 81.48 11.4 1.7 1.73 0.71 2.95 
10/QTR 80.02 12.88 1.74 1.72 0.7 2.91 
Variance decomposition of LTR 
     
1/QTR 77.18 22.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4/QTR 53.98 39.44 2.04 1.12 1.61 1.78 
8/QTR 42.97 50.07 2.92 1.15 1.33 1.53 
10/QTR 40.14 52.99 3 1.15 1.26 1.43 
Variance decomposition of LCURE  
    
1/QTR 11.56 30.43 58 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4/QTR 8.17 49.88 37.84 0.74 2.53 0.82 
8/QTR 6.76 61.07 28.44 0.72 2.23 0.75 
10/QTR 6.2 64.06 25.92 0.72 2.22 0.84 
Variance decomposition of LCAPE 
    
1/QTR 0.09 13.37 15.93 70.59 0.00 0.00 
4/QTR 1.42 25.31 23.05 45.05 5.05 0.08 
8/QTR 1.61 33.05 21.1 38.96 4.97 0.28 
10/QTR 1.61 34.83 20.56 37.66 4.86 0.45 
Variance decomposition of LM2 
    
1/QTR 1.87 20.14 19.15 0.13 58.68 0.00 
4/QTR 3.71 33.88 14.66 1.21 42.97 3.55 
8/QTR 2.53 54.94 10.36 0.86 28.07 3.21 
10/QTR 2.26 61.26 8.99 0.8 23.61 3.05 
Variance decomposition of LCPI  
    
1/QTR 0.00 5.27 5.28 3.26 15.13 71.04 
4/QTR 2.41 14.12 13.74 2.79 24.74 42.17 
8/QTR 2.31 37.7 13.77 2.68 12.65 30.87 
10/QTR 2.27 45.98 12.85 2.63 9.79 26.45 
 
Impulse response functions 
In Figure 6, the impulse response functions trace out the response of current 
and future values of the variables to a one standard deviation increase in the 
current value of oil revenues errors. Following Sims and Zha (1999), 68% 
confidence intervals for the IRFs are estimated in this study. To build these 
confidence bands, 1000 Monte Carlos simulations are employed.  
Figure 6 shows that the innovations to oil revenues are found to have 
statistically significant and positive effects on oil revenues, total revenues and 
marginally government current expenditures only in the first quarter but in the 
long run these effects are insignificant. The responses of other variables to a 
shock in oil revenues are not statistically significant. 
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FIGURE 6 
 Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovation in Oil Revenues 
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Figure 7 demonstrates that a one standard deviation increasing shock in 
government total revenues accompanied by positive and statistically significant 
responses in government total revenues, government expenditures (current and 
capital), money supply and LCPI. This implies that the causality runs from 
government total revenues to government expenditures (both current and 
capital). While the positive response of LCPI is slightly significant in the short 
run but after the third quarter it is becoming more significant.  
Looking at the figures 6 and 7 reveals that it is not the oil revenue shocks 
themselves but the response of government total revenues to them that causes 
fluctuations in aggregate economic activity. 
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FIGURE 7 
 Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovation in Government Total Revenues 
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LOILR to LTR
.00
.04
.08
.12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LTR to LTR
.00
.04
.08
.12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LCURE to LTR
.0
.1
.2
.3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LCAPE to LTR
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LM2 to LTR
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LCPI to LTR
 
 
Figure 8 shows the innovations to government current expenditures have not 
significant effect on oil revenues and the government total revenues. This is 
plausible because the oil revenues are determined exogenously and government 
total revenues are heavily depended on oil revenues, thus government 
expenditures cannot affect them significantly. Also the results indicate that 
government capital and current expenditures and money supply respond to the 
innovations to government current expenditures positively but only significant 
at the first quarter and then, die out. The positive response of LCPI remains 
slightly significant for the first 7 quarters after initial shock and then 
disappears. This implies that government current expenditures are important in 
determining the domestic price levels.     
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FIGURE 8 
 Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovation in Government Current Expenditures 
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The result of Figure 9 shows the innovations to government capital 
expenditures have positive and significant effect on its own variation but they 
have not significant effects on other variables of the study. According to this 
figure there is not causality from government capital expenditures to 
government total revenues. Moreover the government capital expenditures 
variations are not significant in explaining the money supply and domestic 
price changes. 
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FIGURE 9 
 Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovation in Government Capital Expenditures 
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As the main purpose of this study the results of the impulse response functions 
imply that the innovations in government revenues significantly affect the 
government expenditures (both current and capital) in Iran, while the 
innovations in government expenditures cannot affect the government 
revenues significantly. Because the government revenues in Iran are deeply 
affected by oil revenues and government expenditures could not have a 
significant role in explaining the variations in government revenues. Therefore 
in the VAR model of this study the results of the impulse response functions 
confirm the results of the variance decomposition indicating that there can be 
unidirectional causality from government revenues to government 
expenditures (both capital and current) in Iranian economy. 
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4.2.2 The results of the VECM for the second group of the 
variables   
The other area of debate is whether an unrestricted VAR should be used where 
the variables in the VAR are cointegrated. There is a body of literature that 
supports the use of a vector error correction model (VECM), or cointegrating 
VAR, in this situation. It is shown through Monte Carlo simulations that short 
run forecasting performance of unrestricted VAR models are better than 
VECM performance (Farzanegan and Markwardt, 2009). Vector error 
correction (VEC) model is a restricted version of the VAR model. If there is 
cointegration, imposing this restriction will yield more efficient estimates (Naka 
and Tufte, 1997). However as the robustness of my results for the second 
group of the variables in this study, I will try to use the VEC model and 
compare its results with the results of the unrestricted VAR model.  
Since the VEC specification only applies to cointegrated series, I should 
first run the Johansen cointegration test to determine the number of 
cointegrating relations. If I rely on the results of the Phillips-Perron unit root 
test in table 1, I can say that all of the variables are non-stationary and 
integrated of order 1. A vector of variables integrated of order one can be 
cointegrated if there exists linear combination of the variables, which are 
stationary. Following the approach of Johansen and Juselius (1990) two 
likelihood ratio test statistics, the maximal eigenvalue and the trace statistic, 
were utilized to determine the number of cointegrating vectors. The results of 
the maximal eigenvalues and trace test statistics are presented in table 7.  
The test statistics indicate that the hypothesis of no cointegration among 
the variables can be rejected for Iran. The results reveal that at least two 
cointegrating vectors exist among the variables of interest. Therefore, a vector 
error correction model is justified. On the basis of Johansen's test, a Vector 
error correction model (VECM) was estimated. Using the same variables which 
were used in the VAR model, two co-integrating equations were estimated. 
Again, since the results of estimating the VECM do not have a direct 
interpretation, they are not reported here. 
TABLE 7 
 Tests for Cointegration 
 Maximum eigenvalue statistic Trace Statistic 
Rank Max-Eigen Statistic 0.05 Critical Value Trace Statistic 0.05 Critical Value 
r=0 49.10* 40.07 122.19* 95.75 
r≤1 34.10* 33.87 73.09* 69.81 
r≤2 19.41 27.58 38.98 47.85 
r≤3 10.62 21.13 19.56 29.79 
r≤4  8.31 14.26 8.94 15.49 
*: denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
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The variance decomposition results corresponding to the estimated VECM are 
presented in table 8. They are based on the same ordering as was used in the 
VAR. Comparing these results with the results of the VAR model shows that 
the role of shocks to the oil revenues in explaining the shocks to the other 
variables has become more significant in the long run. The shocks to oil 
revenues can explain about 89, 50, 8, 9, 12 and 9 per cent of shocks 
respectively to oil revenues, government total revenues, government current 
expenditures, government capital expenditures, money supply and LCPI in the 
10th quarter for the VEC model, while in the case of VAR variance 
decomposition (as presented in table 6), these percentages were respectively 
about 80, 40, 6, 1.6, 2 and 2.  
Moreover, comparing the VEC variance decomposition results with the 
VAR variance decomposition results show that in the case of VAR the 
contributions of shocks to government total revenues in explaining the shocks 
to LOILR, LTR, LCURE, LM2 and LCPI in 10th quarter are more significant. 
The exception is for LCAPE which in the case of VECM, the contribution of 
government total revenues variations in explaining its variations is more 
significant. 
These results can imply that in the VEC model which the long-run 
behavior of endogenous variables is restricted to converge to their 
cointegration relationships, oil revenue shocks can affect the other 
macroeconomic variables more directly while in the VAR model this 
influencing has changed to be more through the total revenues channel. The 
estimates of variations for government expenditures and government revenues 
in the VEC model in compare to VAR indicate that oil revenues have a more 
leading role in explaining the fiscal policy stance. 
Considering the shocks to the government revenues and expenditures as 
the main purpose of this study reveals that in the VEC model similar to VAR 
model the contributions of government capital and current expenditures in 
explaining the movements in government total revenues are slight, but the 
contribution of government revenue shocks in explaining the shocks to the 
government expenditures (both capital and current) is very considerable. Also 
this again indicates that the strong causality is running from government 
revenues to government expenditures (both current and capital) in Iranian 
economy while the evidence for the reverse causality is very weak. 
Moreover, table 8 shows that for money supply in the short run, the 
largest sources of shocks after its own variations are government current 
expenditures and government total revenues, but in the long run in addition to 
them also the importance of government capital expenditures, oil revenues and 
LCPI in explaining the shocks to money supply are increasing (While in the 
case of VAR model the contribution of total revenues was strongly significant 
and the contribution of oil revenues was almost negligible).  
In addition the results of the VEC model show that the sources of the 
variations in LCPI are distributed among all of the variables. In other words, in 
the long run in addition to its own variation, the variations in LCURE, 
LCAPE, LOILR, LM2 and LTR are significant contributors in explaining the 
shocks to LCPI. These are consistent with some studies about the 
determinants of Iranian inflation which indicate that inflation in Iran can be a 
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monetary phenomenon and moreover government expenditures can increase 
the aggregate demand and consequently cause the inflation. 
 The contributions of oil revenues, government capital and current 
expenditures and LCPI movements to LCPI shocks in VEC model compare to 
the VAR model are more significant. Generally, the VEC model shows a 
relatively higher degree of statistical significance. Theoretically, this is because 
it yields a closer interaction between macroeconomic variables than what the 
VAR indicated. 
TABLE 8 
 Vector error correction (VEC) estimates variance decomposition 
 LOILR LTR LCURE LCAPE LM2 LCPI 
Variance decomposition of LOILR 
     
1/QTR 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4/QTR 90.74 2.53 1.87 3.5 0.31 1.03 
8/QTR 88.8 2.57 2.39 4.53 0.46 1.22 
10/QTR 88.45 2.77 2.64 4.4 0.41 1.29 
Variance decomposition of LTR      
1/QTR 79.15 20.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4/QTR 60. 81 31.38 2.7 1.92 2.62 0.52 
8/QTR 51.92 37.34 5.2 2.01 2.87 0.64 
10/QTR 49.46 39.1 6.04 1.83 2.86 0.68 
Variance decomposition of LCURE      
1/QTR 12.84 33.2 53.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4/QTR 11.33 47.51 29.8 1.91 5.58 3.85 
8/QTR 8.45 56.67 25.01 2.4 4.89 2.55 
10/QTR 7.71 60.07 23.29 2.26 4.46 2.18 
Variance decomposition of LCAPE     
1/QTR 0.09 16.82 13.94 69.12 0.00 0.00 
4/QTR 6.11 29.83 14.05 41.23 7.27 1.48 
8/QTR 8.24 39.68 11.36 29.52 9.5 1.68 
10/QTR 8.69 42.95 10.12 26.54 9.83 1.83 
Variance decomposition of LM2     
1/QTR 1.09 12.49 16.52 0.81 69.06 0.00 
4/QTR 8.86 17.67 15.75 11.12 42.88 3.69 
8/QTR 11.47 21.24 14.71 12.98 34.16 5.41 
10/QTR 11.87 21.71 14.18 13.06 33.32 5.84 
Variance decomposition of LCPI      
1/QTR 0.05 1.9 6.95 7.21 11.62 72.24 
4/QTR 3.55 4.35 23.51 6.02 15.75 46.79 
8/QTR 7.49 6.22 25.79 12.15 8.95 39.37 
10/QTR 8.27 6.49 26.12 13.2 7.84 38.04 
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5   The Iranian economy, sanctions and the political 
implications of  this study 
The most recent external challenges of the Iranian economy are U.S and U.N 
sanctions against the Iranian nuclear program5. The Iranian oil industry has 
been plagued by the sanctions during the last years. Structural upgrades and 
access to new technologies, such as natural gas injections and other enhanced 
oil recovery efforts, have been limited by a lack of investment partly due to 
U.S. sanctions (Ilias, 2010). More recently, the United States has focused on 
targeted financial measures to isolate Iran from the U.S. financial and 
commercial system6. Also the United States has enforced sanctions to reduce 
the development of Iran’s oil industry and constrain Iran’s financial sources. 
The purposes of the recent sanctions are to change the Iranian government 
policies regarding to its nuclear program (as the United States claims).  
Some analysts believe that such sanctions will cause to Iran’s growing 
international trade and financial isolation while some others assert that 
sanctions are not effective at promoting policy change in Iran and they will 
hurt the United States and other countries’ economies which are sending these 
sanctions. 
Economists have argued long and for many reasons that sanctions do not 
work (see van Bergeijk 2009, Chapter 6 and 7 for a review of the literature). 
First, it is hardly possible to make necessary political unity for forceful 
sanctions.  Second, the lapse of time between the decision to use the economic 
sanctions and their actual bureaucratic implementation presents the target 
country the possibility to adjust and circumvent the sanctions. Third, the 
empirical evidence showed a rather low success rate7. 
Bergeijk (1989, 2009) shows that a sanction simply cannot be expected to 
succeed if, for example, economic linkages are too low so that no or hardly any 
damage can ever be done. He states that two basic premises belong to the core 
of economic science. First, boycotts and embargoes deprive the sanctioned 
economy from (some of) the gains from international trade and investment, 
and consequently sanctions reduce welfare. Second, the idea that (the mere 
threat of) this disutility influences the victim’s behavior can also be traced to 
the tenets of economic catechism. 
The findings of the impulse response function for the SVAR model in this 
study show that the government total expenditures to GDP ratio responds 
positively and statistically significantly to shocks in oil revenues. The policy 
                                                
5 - U.S and U.N declare that Iran’s uranium enrichment activities are for the 
development of nuclear weapons. Iran asserts that the purpose of her uranium 
enrichment program is to produce fuel for nuclear power reactors and not for 
developing the nuclear weapons. (Katzman, 2012). 
6 - U.S. efforts to shout Iran out of the international banking system. These efforts 
have been implemented by the Treasury Department through preventing Iran from 
accessing the U.S. financial system (on November 6, 2008 the Treasury Department 
barred U.S. banks from handling any indirect transactions with Iranian banks) and also 
using punishments to pressure firms to cease doing business with Iran ( Katzman, 
2012).  
7 - Bergeijk, 2009. 
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implication of this result is straightforward. Sanctions that succeed in 
restricting the Iranian government's oil export capacities and consequently oil 
export revenues may affect the government total expenditures as an important 
engine for developing the Iranian economy.  
The results of my VAR model offer additional insights as the focus is on 
the government total revenues channel. According to the results of the impulse 
response functions for the VAR model, although the oil revenue shocks have 
positive and significant effect just on the government current expenditures and 
only in the first quarter, the findings show that there is strongly unidirectional 
causality from government total revenues to government current expenditures 
(and also to government capital expenditures). Regarding to the sticky 
downward current expenditures in Iran from the policy point this result is 
important8; if the sanctions decrease the Iranian oil revenues, the government 
total revenues will decline and this will deteriorate the budget deficit of the 
government and impose inflationary pressures on the whole economy. 
Decreasing in government revenues and consequently government 
expenditures will strongly influence the welfare and subsidization programs of 
the government. Subsidies on gasoline and other essential products are part of 
income redistribution programs in Iran which are highly depended on 
government revenues. My results for both VAR and VEC models show that 
government current expenditure variations which are caused by the shocks to 
oil revenues and also government total revenues are stronger than government 
capital expenditure variations. Regarding to the composition of government 
current expenditures, this result indicates that the Iranian people may sense the 
pressures of the sanctions very early and severe9. The decreases in government 
revenues will cause decreases in government payments to its employees (as a 
big portion of the Iranian households) and also financial resources for 
financing the issues related to health, education, pensions and social security. 
This can damage the Iranian people’s standard of life. 
Moreover as the results of the VAR and VEC models indicate, decreases 
in government revenues due to the sanctions may decrease the capital 
expenditures significantly which are mostly used for developing the 
infrastructure of the economy and expanding the current capacity of the 
government. This will reduce the government’s investments in oil and non-oil 
sectors of the economy and as a result will damage the process of the 
economic growth and development of the country in the future years. This 
process may take time and therefore the sanctions may take some time to start 
biting (see also Bergeijk and Marrewijk, 1995). 
                                                
8 - With respect to the importance of the items inside the government current 
expenditures, the government always tries to keep the current expenditures in their 
high level even in the case of a negative oil market to avoid the public discontent. 
9- Current expenditures include the following items: expenditures on goods and services such 
as wage bills of government employees, employer contribution including social security and 
pensions, interest payment, subsidies and all other payments which relate to the management 
of government functions in military, health, education, cultural, and social activities. The 
government invests and creates new capacities in infrastructure services and public goods 
through the capital or development expenditures. (Farzanegan, 2011). 
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However, finally I should add that the effectiveness of sanctions remains 
depended on two main points10. First, to what extent other countries will 
support U.S and U.N on the sanctions against the Iranian oil exports and 
reduce the importing oil from Iran. Second, to what extent the Iranian 
government will be able to find new markets and new customers for its 
exporting oil. 
During the past years Iran has tried to shift her trading relationship from 
western countries to the developing world mostly China, India, Jupon and 
South Korea to improve her bargaining power on her exporting oil and also to 
decrease the damage of the sanctions from the western countries. Against the 
recent sanctions Iran has tried to create some attractions for her exporting oil 
by presenting some special discounts and facilities for the customers. Iran also 
has started to privatize some of the state-run oil and gas companies. 
Privatization of these energy companies can make it easier for investors to 
circumvent U.S. sanctions, which complicate investors’ ability to engage in 
business transactions with Iran directly.11 
6  Summary and conclusions 
In this study I re-examine an important topic— the nexus between 
government expenditure and government revenue—in the area of the public 
economies. Taking into account the heavily dependency of government 
expenditures on oil revenues in Iranian economy as a developing oil export 
based economy I try to take different approach to this issue by considering the 
effects of oil shocks on the dynamic relationship between government 
expenditures and government revenues. For this purpose I use two different 
groups of the variables.  
For the first group of the variables (including oil price, oil revenues to 
GDP ratio, government total expenditures to GDP ratio and a dummy variable 
for capturing the effects of war between Iran and Iraq) I employ a SVAR 
model by imposing three long run restrictions to estimate the dynamic 
relationship among these variables using annual data for the period 1970-2008. 
The results of the variance decomposition analysis indicate that both oil price 
shocks and oil revenue shocks have considerable contributions in explaining 
the shocks to government total expenditures ratio to GDP however the ability 
of oil revenue’s variations in explaining the shocks to the government total 
expenditures to GDP ratio is much better than the ability of oil price shocks. 
Moreover the results of the impulse response functions show that the shocks 
to oil revenues have statistically significant and positive effects on government 
total expenditures to GDP ratio, while the shocks to the government total 
expenditures don’t have significant effect on the government oil revenues to 
                                                
10 - Effectiveness, however, is not a sufficient condition for success (Bergeijk, 2009). 
Considering the UN sanctions against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait shows that 
although these sanctions were effective in delivering economic damage to Iraq but 
they were not successful in changing the Iraqi policy. And eventually they were 
followed by military intervention of ‘Desert Storm’.  
11 - Ilias, 2010. 
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GDP ratio. This indicates that there is unidirectional causality from oil 
revenues to GDP ratio to government total expenditures to GDP ratio in 
Iranian economy. 
For the second group of the variables (including oil revenues, government 
total revenues, government current and capital expenditures, money supply and 
CPI), I use unrestricted VAR and VEC models with respect to their special 
characteristics employing quarterly data for the period 1990:2-2009:1. The 
results of the VAR model show that the variations in government total 
revenues and government current expenditures are sensitive to the shocks to 
oil revenues. The findings for both VAR and VEC models are representing 
that there is unidirectional causality from government total revenues to 
government expenditures (both current and capital). Because of the special 
characteristic of VEC models in restricting the long-run behavior of the 
variables, my findings show that in the case of VEC, oil revenue shocks can 
affect the other macroeconomic variables more directly and strongly while in 
the VAR model this influencing has changed to be more via total revenues 
channel. An unexpected result is that the variations in government current 
expenditures caused by the shocks to oil revenues and total revenues are 
stronger than the variations in government capital expenditures caused by the 
mentioned resources. This indicates that oil revenue fluctuations may affect the 
standard of life of the Iranian people which are mostly the government 
employees. As another result of this study, both VAR and VEC models 
confirm the results of the previous studies indicating that money supply, 
government revenues and government expenditures can be important 
determinants in explaining the Iranian domestic prices.  
These results suggest that fiscal policy appears to be effective in Iran as 
the oil shocks impact government expenditure and then government 
expenditure accounts for a relatively considerable part of the CPI and money 
supply variations. 
From the political view the results of this study show that those sanctions 
aiming to restrict the Iranian government's oil export revenues, potentially can 
affect the government total expenditures as an important engine for 
developing the Iranian economy, but in reality this will remain depended on 
the ability of the Iranian economy in circumventing the sanctions. 
Overall my results support the revenue-spending hypothesis for Iran. In this 
context Iran should enhance the effectiveness of fiscal policy by making 
budget expenditure less driven by revenue availability. This policy can help to 
avoid the costs and instability that variations in public spending generate 
mostly due to the fluctuations in oil revenues. The expenditures can be planed 
and isolated from volatile short-term revenue availability by using a medium-
term expenditure framework. Moreover the Iranian government should reduce 
the dependence of its expenditures to oil revenues by financing these costs 
through nonoil sources such as taxes. 
 Another policy implication of the results reported in this study is that the 
Iranian government should vigorously pursue the independence of the Central 
Bank of Iran (CBI). With an independent CBI the oil stabilization fund can 
mitigate inflationary effects of the oil revenue shocks much better and protect 
the annual state budgets from external shocks. Moreover, Iran should use the 
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oil revenues to develop the other sectors of her economy to reduce her deeply 
reliance on oil revenues in the future. The diversification of non-oil exports 
can reduce the adverse effects of oil price fluctuations (Faraji Dizaji, 2012). 
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